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I. INTRODUCTION
Prevention of crime is clearly a legitimate goal of government. As the
title to this Symposium intimates, however, pursuit of that goal through
restrictions on liberty can raise serious moral quandaries. In previous
work, I have developed a set of principles describing how the government’s
interest in avoiding harm to its citizens may be achieved through the
individual prevention mechanisms of incapacitation, specific deterrence,
and rehabilitation without unduly undermining deontological, retributive
precepts.1 I have applied those principles to civil and criminal commitment
regimes,2 detention of enemy combatants,3 and the death penalty.4 Here,
the focus is on noncapital sentencing.
Sentencing can act as a mechanism for achieving individual prevention
objectives in at least four ways. The first approach, found in determinate
sentencing regimes, is to punish people proportionate to their desert
based on the nature of their crime and their culpability; in this type of

1. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE OF
MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 103–51 (2006).
2. Id. at 122–38.
3. Christopher Slobogin, Defending Preventive Detention, in C RIMINAL LAW
CONVERSATIONS 67, 84–85 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kimberly Kessler
Ferzan eds., 2009).
4. Christopher Slobogin, Capital Punishment and Dangerousness, in MENTAL
DISORDER AND CRIMINAL LAW: RESPONSIBILITY, PUNISHMENT AND COMPETENCE 119
(Robert F. Schopp et al. eds., 2009).
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regime, prevention of crime is a by-product, not a goal, of punishment.5
A competing approach, commonly called indeterminate sentencing, is to
base disposition explicitly on risk assessment and risk management, with
release or conditional release dependent on periodic review of the degree
of risk posed.6 A hybrid “limiting retributivism” approach, recently
recommended by the American Law Institute, involves setting a range of
punishment according to desert, but allowing a risk assessment at the
front end of the process to determine the period of confinement within
that range.7 Another hybrid, the “post-sentence commitment” approach
represented by sexually violent predator (SVP) statutes that currently
exist in the United States, is to intervene based on risk after a desertbased sentence has been served.8
Among the electorate and legislatures in the United States, all of these
sentencing schemes have been popular, with the states close to evenly
split as to which of the regimes, or combination thereof, is adopted.9
Among modern-day legal academics, in contrast, determinate sentencing
and limiting retributivism tend to be preferred over indeterminate
sentencing and post-sentence commitment, at least in part because the
latter two options are viewed as immoral.10 This Article contends to the
contrary that, properly constituted, indeterminate sentencing is both a
morally defensible method of preventing crime and the optimal regime

5. For standard definitions of determinate and indeterminate sentencing, see Kevin R.
Reitz, Demographic Impact Statements, O’Connor’s Warning, and the Mysteries of Prison
Release: Topics from a Sentencing Reform Agenda, 61 FLA. L. REV. 683, 703 (2009).
6. Id.
7. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING §§ 6.01(1), 6B.09(3), at 1, 53 (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 2011); see also Christopher Slobogin, Introduction to the Symposium on the
Model Penal Code’s Sentencing Proposals, 61 FLA. L. REV. 665, 670–71 (2009)
(discussing the preliminary council draft version of Tentative Draft No. 2). Norval
Morris is usually credited with first advancing the limiting retributivism idea. See
NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 1974).
8. See W. Lawrence Fitch, Sexual Offender Commitment in the United States:
Legislative and Policy Concerns, in SEXUALLY COERCIVE BEHAVIOR: UNDERSTANDING AND
MANAGEMENT 489, 490–91 (Robert A. Prentky et al. eds., 2003).
9. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1196–97 (2005) (noting that
eighteen states plus the federal government have adopted sentencing guidelines that tend
in the direction of determinate sentencing but that a number of states have also rejected
the guidelines approach).
10. Michael Tonry, Introduction: Thinking About Punishment, in WHY PUNISH?
HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT 3, 6 (Michael Tonry ed., 2011) (“By 1980 . . . .
[m]ost writing on punishment philosophy and theory had a pronounced retributive
slant.”).
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for doing so, at least for crimes against person and most other street
crimes.11
More specifically, the position defended in this Article is that, once a
person is convicted of an offense, the duration and nature of sentence
should be based on a back-end decision made by experts in recidivism
reduction, within broad ranges set by the legislature. Compared to
determinate sentencing, the sentencing regime advanced in this Article
relies on wider sentence ranges and explicit assessments of risk, cabined
only very loosely by desert. Compared to limiting retributivism, the key
difference is that risk assessments are periodic rather than made at the
front end, thus producing sentences that are much more individualized
and flexible. Finally, post-sentence commitment based on risk would not
make sense in an indeterminate sentencing regime that is already
focused on that criterion.
The territory covered in this Article, particularly as it addresses the
debate between deontological retributivists and utilitarians, is well trodden.
But this Article seeks to provide new perspectives on the morality,
legality, and practicality of indeterminate sentencing. It starts with an
outline of what a properly constituted indeterminate sentencing regime
would look like. It then defends this regime against numerous objections.
II. CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
In theory, indeterminate sentencing is the sentencing regime that is the
most cost-effective means of protecting the public from recidivism
because it is explicitly designed to limit both false negatives and false
positives. In contrast to determinate sentencing and limiting retributivism,
indeterminate sentencing that works as it should is less likely either to
permit premature release—and thus generate false negatives—or to
authorize prolonged confinement beyond that necessary to ensure societal
protection—and thus create false positives.12 In contrast to post-sentence
11. Indeterminate sentencing might be optimal for fraud and white collar crimes as
well, but both risk assessment and risk management are at a more nascent stage for these
crimes. General deterrence might also have more of a role to play in this setting,
although this Article generally takes a jaundiced view of deterrence as a meaningful
crime prevention mechanism. See infra text accompanying notes 129–32. Alternatively,
many of these crimes might be better handled in the civil system. See Darryl K. Brown,
Criminal Law’s Unfortunate Triumph over Administrative Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
657, 661–62 (2011).
12. Joan Petersilia, California’s Correction Paradox of Excess and Deprivation, in
37 CRIME AND JUSTICE 207, 252–53 (Michael Tonry ed., 2008) (“[Under California’s
determinate sentencing regime a] large percentage of Californians who are nonviolent
criminals are accumulating very extensive criminal records . . . . [yet] may not be any
more dangerous than offenders in other states who are left ‘on the street’ and successfully
handled through an array of community-based intermediate sanctions. [At the same

1130

SLOBOGIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 48: 1127, 2011]

1/3/2012 4:43 PM

Prevention as the Primary Goal of Sentencing
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

commitment, it avoids any incarceration unrelated to risk reduction that
occurs in connection with the sentence preceding commitment as well as
the negative effects of singling out autonomous individuals for special
preventive intervention that stem from the post-sentence commitment.13
Indeterminate sentencing has no chance of realizing these benefits in a
morally defensible manner, however, unless it adheres to constitutionally
sound tenets. Elsewhere I have argued that seven principles should
govern the state’s exercise of preventive intervention authority, whenever it
is exercised: (1) the principle of legality, which requires commission of a
crime or imminently risky conduct before preventive detention takes
place; (2) the risk-proportionality principle, which requires that government
prove a probability and magnitude of risk proportionate to the duration
and nature of the contemplated intervention; (3) the related least drastic
means principle, which requires the government to adopt the least
invasive means of accomplishing its preventive goals and thus may well
preclude confinement as well as require treatment in many cases; (4) the
principle of criminal justice primacy, which requires that systems of
preventive detention separate from criminal justice be limited to detention
of those whose subsequent behavior is unlikely to be affected even by a
significant prospect of serious criminal punishment; (5) the evidentiary
rule that, when government seeks preventive confinement, it may only
prove its case using actuarial-based probability estimates or, in their
absence, previous antisocial conduct; (6) the evidentiary rule that the
subject of preventive detention may rebut the government’s case concerning
risk with clinical risk assessments, even if they are not as provably
reliable as actuarial prediction; (7) the procedural principle that a
subject’s risk and risk management plans must periodically be reviewed
using procedures that ensure voice for the subject and avoid executive
branch domination of the decisionmaking process.14
The first four principles impose substantive limitations on preventive
intervention. The final three principles are procedural in nature. Below,
the rationale for each is summarized, both in an effort to advance thinking

time], California’s sentencing system also releases violent offenders who amass lengthy
criminal records—individuals who, in a system more carefully tailored to protect public
safety, probably should not have been released in the first place.”); see also infra Part IV.
13. For discussion of these negative effects, see SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 122–
26.
14. See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 120–24.
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about prevention generally and with the goal of elaborating how the
principles apply to sentencing.
A. The Act Requirement: A Crime or Imminently Risky Conduct
As an empirical matter, almost all individuals who are considered a
serious risk to others are likely to have committed at least one previous
criminal act. In theory, however, an assessment of risk does not require
a predicate crime. The right combination of psychological, physiological,
and situational factors might permit a fairly robust prediction that
violence will ensue without such an act. For instance, knowledge that an
individual is a psychopath and a member of a gang committed to
defending its turf might lead to a high certainty that the individual will
commit a violent act in the near future.
Even if the prediction is highly accurate, however, preventive
detention should not take place in the absence of conduct that is either a
crime or highly and obviously predictive of one. This conclusion flows
from the principle of legality, which applies in both the criminal and
civil contexts, and in the United States stems from the Due Process
Clause found in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution.15 The principle of legality posits, inter alia, that the basis
for depriving individuals of life, liberty, or property may not be so vague
or so broadly framed that government officials can intervene at their
whim.16 Thus, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down a
loitering statute because it “contains no standard for determining what a
suspect has to do in order to satisfy [its] requirement[s]” and therefore
“vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to
determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute.”17
The legality principle protects liberty interests not only by restricting
the discretion of police, prosecutors, and courts but also by ensuring that
individual autonomy is respected, a goal that is worth pursuing even if
one’s perspective is purely consequentialist. Interventions based solely
on the nature of one’s genes, condition, or environment would be very

15. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates
the first essential of due process of law.”).
16. See generally John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction
of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 212 (1985) (“The rule of law . . . . means that the
agencies of official coercion should, to the extent feasible, be guided by rules—that is,
by openly acknowledged, relatively stable, and generally applicable statements of proscribed
conduct. The evils to be retarded are caprice and whim, the misuse of government power for
private ends, and the unacknowledged reliance on illegitimate criteria of selection.”).
17. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (emphasis added).
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difficult to avoid. Many commonly used risk factors either are
unchangeable—as is the case with age, gender, and some forms of paranoid
mental disorder—or cannot realistically be changed without significant
help or effort—as with poverty, unemployment, psychopathy, and
substance abuse.18 Allowing government to intervene preventively upon
proof of such risk factors without additional proof of antisocial conduct
would result in counterproductive curtailments of liberty. For instance,
it might pressure even law-abiding citizens to avoid any condition or
situation, however innocuous in itself, that is potentially associated with
risk, and it might impose highly distracting burdens on those who, whether
generally law-abiding or not, have difficulty avoiding such conditions or
situations.
The practical consequence of the legality principle is that preventive
detention may not occur unless the individual has committed a crime—
presumably defined at least in part consistent with desert—or has engaged
in conduct that poses an imminent risk of crime. The latter situation
might occur when police have reasonable suspicion that the person is
about to engage in criminal activity19 or a person with a communicable
disease enters the public domain.20 On the same reasoning, once detention
takes place the imposition of new or greater restrictions on liberty is
prohibited unless additional criminal or imminently risky conduct
occurs.
The legality principle not only requires antecedent conduct before
liberty deprivation may occur but also mandates a clear statement
as to the basis for the intervention.21 In the prevention context, this basis
consists not only of the triggering act that was just described but also of
the act or acts sought to be prevented. The first type of conduct can be
called “predictive conduct” and the second “object conduct.” Very often,
predictive and object conduct will be of the same type; for example, an
18. See infra Part III.B.
19. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The definition of reasonable
suspicion has spawned a rich literature, which can be informed by legality concerns. Cf.
Dannye Holley, The Supreme Courts: Did September 11th Accelerate Their Sanctioning
the Constitutionality of Criminalizing Suspicion?, 7 PIERCE L. REV. 39, 44–52, 80–83
(2008) (discussing the constitutionality of criminalizing refusal to cooperate with the
police).
20. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26–39 (1905).
21. Jeffries, supra note 16, at 196 (“[T]he vagueness doctrine is the operational
arm of legality. It requires that advance, ordinarily legislative crime definition be
meaningfully precise—or at least that it not be meaninglessly indefinite.” (footnote
omitted)).
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assault may be predictive of assault. In other contexts, the predictive
conduct will be different from the object conduct; for instance, stalking
may be predictive of assault. The legality principle demands that both
the predictive and object conduct be defined beforehand, preferably through
legislation, although in the case of predictive conduct, inclusion in a
court order or risk assessment instrument might be sufficient. If the
predictive conduct is not a crime, the government must adduce proof that
it is imminently risky or the legality principle will be violated.22
This latter requirement is most relevant in the commitment and street
stop contexts, where preventive action is often based on conduct that is
not clearly criminal, rather than at sentencing, which is based on a
conviction for crime. However, in the United Kingdom, courts are now
issuing antisocial behavioural orders (ASBOs) that permit imposition of
a five-year sentence based on noncriminal behavior. Specifically, the
object conduct sought to be prevented by such orders may consist of any
behavior that causes or is “likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress,”
and the predictive conduct may consist of anything the court decides
might lead to such harm, such as drinking or entering certain areas.23
ASBOs violate the legality principle if the object conduct they specify is
not found in the criminal code or if the predictive conduct they specify
does not imminently lead to the object conduct.24 If these legality
violations occur, sentences triggered by violation of ASBOs are illegitimate.
B. The Risk Necessary for Intervention: The Risk-Proportionality
Principle
The most important substantive question raised by preventive
detention is the degree of risk necessary to justify intervention or, in the
case of sentencing, prolongation of the intervention. At one extreme,
society could decide that once a person meets the act predicate, that
person could be preventively detained upon any showing of risk for any
type of antisocial behavior. At the other extreme, society could prohibit
intervention until the government adduces proof beyond a reasonable

22. Cf. Alan M. Dershowitz, Dangerousness as a Criterion for Confinement,
2 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 172, 176 (1974) (arguing that the harms that justify
intervention in commitment cases should be as clearly delineated as they are under the penal
laws).
23. Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales
and the Limits of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 279, 298 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (quoting Crime & Disorder Act,
(1998 Annual Abridgment) § 1(1)(a), HALS. STAT. (4th ed.) 191 (Eng.)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
24. More is said about when conduct is clearly predictive below. See infra Part
II.E.
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doubt that the person will commit a serious, violent crime. Neither of
these positions is consistent with long-standing justice principles, however;
instead the law has taken a contextual approach. For instance, as interpreted
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that “the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed.”25 In essence, Jackson announces
what I will call the risk-proportionality principle, to distinguish it from
retribution-based proportionality.
In a determinate sentencing regime, punishment is generally supposed
to be proportionate to desert (culpability). In an indeterminate sentencing
regime, dispositions should be proportionate to risk. Risk can be measured
along a number of dimensions, but the two most important are the
probability that harm will occur and its magnitude.26 Although a high
probability and magnitude of harm might justify serious preventive
measures, including long-term confinement, minimal probability and
magnitude of harm should rarely be the basis for significant preventive
intervention.27
American law has long implicitly recognized this risk-proportionality
principle.28 Preventive intervention always requires some justification,
and that justification becomes more onerous as the intervention becomes
more significant. Even a brief detention on the street requires reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is occurring or is imminent.29 Short-term
emergency civil commitment requires probable cause to believe a person
is a danger to others,30 and pretrial detention requires a preponderance
showing or clear and convincing evidence that a felony will otherwise

25.
26.

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (emphasis added).
See ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH
SYSTEM 678–82 (1974).
27. However, expressive and deterrence concerns may dictate nominal sentences
beyond those warranted by a single-minded focus on prevention. See infra text
accompanying notes 136–37.
28. The German Federal Constitutional Court has explicitly recognized it.
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Administrative Court] Feb. 2, 2004,
docket number 2 BvR 2029/01 (Ger.), available at www.bundesverfas
sungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/rs20040205_2bvr202901.html.
29. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
30. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 2010) (providing that emergency
detention requires probable cause regarding mental disorder and risk to others); cf.
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–12 (1975) (requiring probable cause for arrest).
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occur.31 Moving up the ladder, long-term civil commitment requires
clear and convincing evidence that hospitalization is needed to prevent
serious bodily injury.32 Sexually violent predator commitment usually
requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that another sex offense will
be committed, and a death sentence based on risk is permissible only
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a violent crime will otherwise
occur.33 A version of the risk-proportionality principle is also recognized in
connection with detention of enemy combatants, where courts have held
that “evidence that may have justified the initial detention will not serve
in retrospect to convince a court to bless it.”34
Unfortunately, although the typical standards of proof reflect
proportionality analysis, many statutes and courts fudge the interventionthreshold issue by failing to adhere to risk-proportionality reasoning in
defining the legal standard—the probability of risk and the magnitude of
risk that must be shown. Under Texas’s death penalty statute, for instance,
an offender is considered eligible for the death penalty when the state
can show beyond a reasonable doubt “a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society.”35 Even though dangerousness so defined must be
proven under the reasonable doubt standard—which sounds consistent
with proportionality reasoning—the statute defines dangerousness itself
in terms of “a probability.” Thus, a Texas prosecutor seeking a death
sentence need only show a probability of harm beyond a reasonable
doubt. Furthermore, the magnitude of harm described in this statute—a
criminal act of violence—is extremely vague and, to the extent an assault
is considered violent, insufficiently proportionate to the preventive
intervention at stake. Together, the probability and magnitude elements
of this statute mean that the dangerousness aggravator under Texas death
penalty law is proven even if there is less than a 50% chance that the
offender will commit another crime and even if that crime is only a
simple assault.
31. See, e.g., Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)–(f) (2006 &
Supp. III 2010); see also United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 194–95 (2d Cir. 1987)
(requiring that risk of flight be proven by the preponderance standard in pretrial detention
cases).
32. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432–33 (1979).
33. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a), (e) (2005); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071 (West 2006).
34. Benjamin Wittes, Robert Chesney & Rabea Benhalim, The Emerging Law of
Detention: The Guantánamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking 25 (Univ. Tex. Pub. Law &
Legal Theory, Research Paper Series, Paper No. 165, 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1540601. The Israeli Supreme Court has reached a similar conclusion. See
CrimA (TA) 6659/06 A. v. Israel 1, 43–44 (2008) (Isr.), translated in http://elyon1.
court.gov.il/files_eng/06/590/066/n04/06066590.n04.pdf.
35. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071.
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If the proportionality principle underlying Jackson were taken seriously,
these types of practices could not continue. In the United States, the
anchor for risk-proportionality analysis should be the reasonable suspicion
required for a police stop because that legal standard is mandated by the
Fourth Amendment’s stipulation that seizures be reasonable.36 Reasonable
suspicion has been quantified at approximately a 20%–30% level of
certainty that the person stopped is about to engage in some sort of
criminal activity,37 and under the Supreme Court’s case law, that level of
risk permits a detention on the street of no more than twenty minutes.38
Using that rule as a baseline for risk-proportionality reasoning,
incarceration for preventive purposes should require proof of a higher
degree of risk, perhaps at the 50% level, which is analogous to the probable
cause required for an arrest. If confinement becomes prolonged, it should
require increasingly higher showings of risk, both in terms of probability
and magnitude, while the death penalty could be imposed only upon
sufficient proof of near certainty that the person will commit a seriously
violent felony.
If implemented in the manner described, the risk-proportionality
principle requires a level of proof that, compared with current preventive
detention practices, will reduce false positives—people declared to be a
legally sufficient risk but who are not—but will also probably increase
false negatives—people who do not pose a legally sufficient risk but
who in fact will recidivate if released. The tradeoff between false positives
and false negatives need not be a zero-sum game, however. Although
reducing either rate below 25% is very difficult, researchers have been
able to develop prediction techniques that come close to this goal. Thus,
for instance, an Area Under (the Receiving Operating Characteristic)
Curve (AUC) of .78, a not-uncommon value for actuarial risk assessment
instruments, can provide a cutoff score that produces a 30% false positive

36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[T]here is ‘no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion
which the search [or seizure] entails.’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,
536–37 (1967))).
37. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence,
or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1327–28 tbl.4 (1982) (reporting
the results of a survey of federal judges asked to quantify probable cause and reasonable
suspicion).
38. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 683 (1985).
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rate and a 20% false negative rate.39 Note also that failing to meet the
higher proof standards merely means the government cannot confine the
individual. There are often less restrictive ways of reducing risk that can
limit the number of false negatives40 and that may even be mandated
under the next principle to be discussed.
C. Disposition: The Least Drastic Risk-Reducing Intervention
Assume now that a person has committed the necessary predicate act
and that the degree of risk necessary to justify some sort of state
intervention has been shown. The next issue that arises is the type of
disposition that the government may impose on the individual. Here,
again, substantive due process plays a significant role. It is a constitutional
axiom under American law that if the government deprives an individual
of a fundamental right, such as liberty, it must do so in the least drastic
manner necessary to achieve its objective.41
The government’s objective in this setting is prevention of harm to
others. Thus, in the dispositional context the least drastic means principle
means that, even if risk justifying confinement has been proven,
confinement may occur only if necessary to achieve prevention of harm
and may continue only if it remains necessary to achieve that aim. In
Jackson’s wording, confinement must bear a “reasonable relation” to the
government’s need to protect society or it is not permissible.42 Thus, as
many states recognize, a person subject to civil commitment as dangerous
to others is entitled to the least restrictive available disposition, which
might consist of outpatient rather than inpatient commitment.43 Similarly, a
person committed as an SVP may not be confined if less restrictive
options, including community registration and notification laws, ankle
bracelets, or community treatment, can adequately protect society. Most
dramatically, the least drastic means principle means that the death

39. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW,
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 107
(2007) (citing relevant research).
40. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The
Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 26–30 (2009) (describing successful community
treatment programs for violent juvenile offenders).
41. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our
opinions applying the doctrine known as ‘substantive due process’ hold that the Due Process
Clause prohibits States from infringing fundamental liberty interests, unless the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.” (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997))).
42. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
43. See Ingo Keilitz, David Conn & Andrea Giampetro, Least Restrictive Treatment of
Involuntary Patients: Translating Concepts into Practice, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 691,
707–08 (1985).
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penalty can virtually never be used as a method of prevention, even if the
high degree of risk necessary to justify it is proven, because the option of
confinement can achieve the government’s goal equally effectively.44
Jackson’s language, echoed in other U.S. Supreme Court decisions
such as Youngberg v. Romeo 45 and Seling v. Young, 46 has one other
important implication for the dispositional consequences of a finding of
risk. If available treatment will reduce the duration of the government’s
intervention and the individual is willing to undergo it, that treatment
must be provided. As Youngberg put it, “[L]iberty interests require the
State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint.”47 An individual committed to
a mental institution as dangerous to others is entitled to treatment with
antipsychotic medication if medication would reduce the time in
confinement and is medically appropriate. A prisoner whose sentence is
based on risk to society should, within reason, be offered vocational and
rehabilitative opportunities that can reduce that risk.
The right to treatment in a preventive regime can also be viewed as a
compensatory mechanism. Several commentators have concluded that
to the extent confinement is preventive rather than punitive in nature,
some sort of monetary restitution is required.48 In the sentencing
context, where disposition is triggered by a culpable act, separating out a
disposition’s punitive impact from its preventive aspects is probably
impossible. In any event, as Lippke points out, compensation of
dangerous offenders is “politically infeasible” and “unlikely to alter
significantly the material conditions of preventive detention.”49 Treatment,
on the other hand, is politically sellable and, if at all successful, can alter
the nature of the intervention and might even accelerate release.

44. Slobogin, supra note 4, at 126.
45. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (“It may well be unreasonable
not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or
the likelihood of violence.”).
46. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265 (2001) (“[D]ue process requires that the
conditions and duration of confinement under the Act bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose for which persons are committed.” (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71,
79 (1992))).
47. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added).
48. Michael Corrado, Punishment, Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, 15
CRIM. J UST . E THICS 3, 11 (1996); Ferdinand D. Schoeman, On Incapacitating the
Dangerous, in SENTENCING 175, 181 (Hyman Gross & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 1981).
49. Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders and Preventive
Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 413 (2008).
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Treatment can be seen as compensation for that part of confinement that
is preventive because it is designed to assist the individual in addressing
psychological or situational risk factors—some of which may exist
because of societal flaws—that otherwise will likely lead to conflict and
further punishment.
D. Criminal Justice System Primacy: The Undeterrability
Predicate
Preventive detention can take place within the criminal justice system
or outside of it. Pretrial detention, indeterminate sentencing, and capital
sentencing are triggered by the commission of a crime and may occur
only if a culpable mental state has been proven. In contrast, according to
the U.S. Supreme Court, numerous other preventive detention regimes—
quarantine, civil commitment, commitment of people found not guilty
by reason of insanity, commitment of sexually violent offenders after
they have served their sentence, and detention of enemy combatants—
are noncriminal in nature.50 With the possible exception of the enemy
combatant situation, the deprivation of liberty that occurs via these
separate regimes is based entirely on an assessment of what the person
will do, not what the person has done. Although, as noted earlier, the
legality principle mandates a predicate act, in all of these situations that
requirement exists solely as a side constraint on government power; it is
not the justification for the intervention.
This distinction between criminal and noncriminal prevention is
important because it triggers application of one last substantive limitation
on preventive detention, a limitation that might prohibit intervention
even when the government can demonstrate the requisite conduct, the
requisite risk, and a readiness to implement the least drastic disposition
necessary to contain it. The limitation comes from the Supreme Court’s
holding in Kansas v. Hendricks, which dealt with the constitutionality of

50. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 783 (2008) (“Habeas corpus proceedings
need not resemble a criminal trial, even when the detention is by executive order.”); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362–69 (1997) (holding that sexual predator statutes are civil
in nature); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (“[A] civil commitment proceeding
can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution.”). Two other preventive schemes
that might be classified as noncriminal are material witness detentions under statutes
such as 18 U.S.C. § 3144 and predeportation detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). But in
fact both of these detentions should be triggered by a crime—contempt of court and
illegal entry, respectively. To the extent they are not, they should be impermissible under the
principles endorsed here and, at least in connection with material witness detentions,
may also be unconstitutional. Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of “Hold
Until Cleared”: Reexamining Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September
11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L. REV. 677, 731 (2005).
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SVP statutes.51 In that case, the petitioner argued that his SVP
commitment after he had served his sentence for child molestation
violated substantive due process, for the simple reason that he was not
seriously mentally ill. Hendricks’s lawyers pointed out that, historically,
civil commitment had been reserved for people with psychosis and
similar mental problems and that the SVP statute expanded this traditional
role by permitting commitment of people with personality disorders. The
Supreme Court refused to strike down the SVP law. But it did signal
that dangerousness is insufficient, on its own, to justify preventive detention
outside the criminal justice system. Without admitting it was doing so, the
Court amended the SVP statute at issue in Hendricks by stating that the
law required the government to show that the person not only is
dangerous but also has great difficulty in controlling his or her behavior;
as the Court put it, the person must be “dangerous beyond [his or her]
control.”52 In Kansas v. Crane, the Court reiterated that holding, while
also stating that there may be “considerable overlap” between difficulty
in controlling behavior and “defective understanding or appreciation.”53
The Court has never provided a clear rationale for this lack of
control/lack of appreciation limitation on preventive detention. As many
have pointed out, the explanation cannot be that those committed under
these laws are excused by reason of insanity, because then they would
not have been subjected to their precommitment sentence.54 But a
rationale does exist if one assumes that individuals who experience the
“dangerous beyond control” dysfunction are very hard to deter. On this
assumption, the criminal justice system is powerless to protect society
from these people, and the government is justified in establishing a
preventive regime for them separate from the criminal process. In other
words, the state may resort to a system other than the criminal justice
process to prevent harm to others when, and only when, the individual is
characteristically unaffected by the prospect of serious criminal
punishment—when the person is truly “undeterrable” by the criminal
sanction.55
51. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346.
52. Id. at 357–58.
53. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Insanity Def. Work Grp., American Psychiatric Association Statement on the Insanity
Defense, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 681, 685 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Protecting Liberty and Autonomy: Desert/Disease
Jurisprudence, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1112–14 (2011).
55. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 129–41.
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At least four categories of people might be considered eligible for
detention in a noncriminal system on the ground that they are undeterrable
by criminal sanctions. The first category consists of those offenders who
are seriously mentally ill. People with psychosis who commit crimes
often do not know they are doing so or think they are acting in selfdefense. Fear of the criminal law can have no impact on their actions.
On this view, a separate preventive detention system for insanity acquittees
or a civil commitment system for people who suffer from psychosis is
justifiable.
Second, some offenders with severe impulse control problems,
although not as compromised as people with psychosis, might be said to
be undeterrable at the time of their crime. As Justice Scalia stated in
Crane, if SVP laws make sense, it is because “[o]rdinary recidivists choose
to reoffend and are therefore amenable to deterrence through the criminal
law” while “those subject to civil commitment under [SVP laws] . . . are
unlikely to be deterred.”56 However, the degree of undeterrability must be
significant or this reasoning could easily end up justifying preventive
intervention against “ordinary recidivists” as well. As the Minnesota
Supreme Court held in In re Blodgett, sex offender commitment requires
proof not only of risk but also of “an utter lack of power to control their
sexual impulses.”57 Other people who might fall into this category are
those at the extreme end of the psychopathy spectrum—those who evidence
complete disrespect and disregard for the law—and people with severe
addictions who could be said to have disorders of desire.58
The third category of individuals who might qualify for preventive
intervention outside the criminal justice system is comprised of enemy
combatants and others whose goal is to destroy the state. Of course,
these individuals are typically neither mentally ill nor severely
compromised volitionally. But they are under orders to harm soldiers
and, in the case of terrorists, innocent civilians; their entire existence is
devoted to killing others even if their own death is the result. For that
reason many enemy combatants and some terrorists might also be
56. Crane, 534 U.S. at 420 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
57. In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 1994) (quoting State ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, 287 N.W. 297, 302 (Minn. 1939), aff’d, 309 U.S. 270 (1940))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Thomas v. State, 74 S.W.3d 789, 791–92
(Mo. 2002) (holding that commitment requires proof of “serious difficulty in controlling
. . . behavior”); In re Commitment of W.Z., 801 A.2d 205, 216–18 (N.J. 2002) (holding
that commitment requires proof of an “inability to control one’s sexually violent
behavior”).
58. Cf. Morse, supra note 54, at 1110, 1116 (arguing that psychopaths “cannot grasp or be
guided by the good moral reasons not to offend,” an incapacity that could be “expressed as either
a cognitive or control defect,” and also concluding that “internal duress” or “disorders of desire”
might explain some crimes committed by addicts (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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considered undeterrable. Consistent with this rationale, in recent years
most American judges who have addressed the issue of when a person
fits the combatant category have focused on “whether the individual
functions or participates within or under the command structure of the
organization—i.e., whether he receives and executes orders or directions.”59
Even those who have supported terrorist efforts may not be preventively
detained outside the criminal justice system if they do not meet this test.
But those who do meet it may be detained until the “cessation of
hostilities” or at least until they can demonstrate they do not pose a risk
to innocent citizens.60
The final category of individuals who could be said to be undeterrable
consists of those who endanger others simply through the act of remaining
free within the jurisdiction. Individuals with highly communicable diseases
are illustrative. The harm to others presented by such people when they
are in the public domain is literally unstoppable. Unlike the ordinary
recidivist who can choose to avoid harm to others, contagious individuals
have no control over harm they cause, unless they are confined.
An alternative rationale often advanced for long-term preventive
detention, mentioned above, is that in a society that values autonomy
such detention is only permissible for individuals who are lacking in
autonomy.61 Many nonautonomous people, such as those found insane,

59. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009).
60. Id. at 70; cf. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War arts. 42–43, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 (providing
for “internment . . . only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it absolutely
necessary” and for semiannual review of the decision); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE
1300.7, TRAINING AND EDUCATION MEASURES NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THE CODE OF
CONDUCT (1988) (describing “parole agreements” allowing release of prisoners of war
who promise not to bear arms).
61. See, e.g., Eric S. Janus, Hendricks and the Moral Terrain of Police Power
Civil Commitment, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 297, 298 (1998) (“Properly understood,
the Hendricks decision will limit civil commitment to those who are ‘too sick to deserve
punishment.’” (quoting Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1968))); Stephen
J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and Irrational People, 88 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1025–27,
1077 (2002) (arguing that sexual predator commitment should be limited to those who are
“nonresponsible”). Alec Walen accepts this premise but nonetheless develops some
exceptions that seem consistent with, albeit broader than, the undeterrability rationale. Alec
Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost Status as a Foundation
for a Lost Immunity, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1229, 1236–37 n.27, 1256, 1259–60 (2011)
(arguing that preventive detention is permissible for those who (1) lose their “status as a
presumptively law-abiding person” when they commit numerous felonies or a very
serious crime; (2) have a duty to quarantine themselves; or (3) are not policeable in their
home country).

1143

SLOBOGIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

1/3/2012 4:43 PM

are also undeterrable in the sense used here. But many individuals
identified above as undeterrable—perhaps impulsive sex offenders and
certainly enemy combatants and those afflicted with contagious
diseases—are autonomous actors. The lack-of-autonomy rationale does
not explain why the latter groups may be preventively detained, despite
the fact that both combatants and the contagious—clearly autonomous
actors—have always been subject to such detention. More importantly,
the lack-of-autonomy rationale speaks only to the absence of a strong
individual interest in avoiding preventive detention; it does not explain
why the state has an interest in pursuing preventive detention outside the
criminal justice system. In contrast, the undeterrability rationale clarifies
that the state’s interest in protecting its citizens is at its height when the
criminal justice system can have no impact. In other words, the
undeterrability rationale better explains from both the individual’s
and the state’s perspective why many nonautonomous actors may be
preventively detained—their undeterrability, not their lack of autonomy—
and also explains why some autonomous actors may be so detained.
To readers who are concerned that this formulation unduly denigrates
autonomy, two responses are in order. First, those who are truly
undeterrable either are lacking in autonomy or have demonstrated a
characteristic willingness to exercise their autonomy in the wrong
direction; in neither situation is the individual’s autonomy worthy of
respect. In any event, autonomy and its close cousin desert should not
be automatic trump cards against preventive detention. As this Article
develops further below,62 there are solid reasons for depriving autonomous
yet dangerous actors of liberty even if the liberty deprivation exceeds
whatever punishment desert principles might dictate.
E. Proof of Risk: Probability Estimates
Under the risk-proportionality principle, the government is required to
prove a high degree of risk in order to justify confinement. A very
important question is how the government can meet its burden of proof
in preventive detention cases. Traditionally, evidence of risk was “clinical”
in nature. The best evidence of this sort relies on intensive interviews
with the subject of the risk assessment and on scrutiny of third-party
records and witnesses, designed to discern patterns of antisocial behavior,
the degree of impulsivity, typical responses to perceived slights, and the
like. More recently, researchers have devised actuarial instruments that
allow evaluators to place a given individual within a numerical risk
category. For instance, the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) relies
62.
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on twelve variables found to be predictive of risk: degree of psychopathy,
elementary school misconduct, DSM diagnosis, age at time of offense,
and history of alcohol abuse are among the items considered in the
course of producing a score that can then be correlated with recidivism
rates of people who received similar scores.63 Structured professional
judgment (SPJ) approaches are less statistical in orientation but can still
result in individual scores, which in turn have been associated with
statistical risk estimates.64
In the United States, courts are still in a state of flux as to which type
of risk assessment they prefer. The Supreme Court has made clear that,
as a constitutional matter, the government may rely on even the most
suspect type of prediction testimony in proving risk.65 However, the
rules of evidence still govern matters of proof in a given jurisdiction. In
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals66 and its progeny, especially
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,67 the Supreme Court has construed the
rules applicable in federal courts to prohibit expert testimony unless its
basis has been subject to some sort of verification process, ideally
including the generation of error rates that provide the factfinder with a
sense of how much weight to give to the testimony. Further, even if
expert testimony is sufficiently probative under Daubert, it is still
inadmissible if it has the potential for biasing or overinfluencing the
jury—a consideration applicable to all evidence, expert and lay.68 Although
few courts have excluded expert prediction testimony under these rules,
they are beginning to pay closer attention to the issue.69
I have argued that under the balancing analysis required under the
federal evidence rules, government experts in risk assessment proceedings
that will result in incarceration should be limited to statistically based
probability estimates of the type most commonly produced by actuarial
instruments, unless the defense opens the door to use of clinical or SPJ

63. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND
MANAGING RISK 143 (1998).
64. For a more elaborate description of these various approaches, see SLOBOGIN,
supra note 39, at 101–06.
65. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896–903 (1983).
66. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
67. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
68. See FED. R. EVID. 401, 403.
69. See CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, RALPH REISNER & ARTI RAI, LAW AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 487–88 (5th ed. 2009)
(describing recent cases).
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risk assessment testimony.70 Actuarial prediction testimony is clearly
superior to unstructured clinical prediction testimony with respect to
both the probative value and prejudice inquiries, for a number of reasons.
First, research has firmly established that predictions based on the
clinical method, although typically better than chance, are less valid than
actuarial predictions by a significant magnitude.71 Second, clinical
predictions are very hard to assess in terms of error rates because the
clinical method varies from evaluator to evaluator; in contrast, actuarialbased predictions provide standardized error rate information. Third,
although actuarial prediction testimony identifies a quantified probability
estimate that can be compared with the standards of proof described
earlier, experts relying on clinical prediction can at most make general
statements about risk, such as “the offender poses a higher than average
risk” or “the respondent represents a low risk.” These latter types of
statements can mean very different things to different evaluators and in
any event are not susceptible to verification. These considerations mean
that actuarial evidence has much greater probative value than unstructured
clinical prediction testimony.
With respect to the prejudice inquiry, laboratory research and evidence
from actual cases indicate that, despite its more questionable reliability,
clinical prediction testimony presented by the government is extremely
influential with judges and juries, much more so than actuarial prediction,
perhaps because of its seemingly more “individualized” nature.72 Clinical
testimony that a person is likely to be violent is difficult to rebut even
with effective cross-examination and opposing witnesses.73 The danger
is great that factfinders attribute too much weight to this type of testimony
precisely because it is so vague.
Unless associated with probability estimates, expert opinions derived
from SPJ assessments suffer from the same evidentiary deficiencies that
afflict unstructured clinical assessment. SPJ is apt to be more closely
focused on relevant risk and protective factors than any other approach,

70. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 39, at 122–29.
71. Eric S. Janus & Robert A. Prentky, Forensic Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment
with Sex Offenders: Accuracy, Admissibility and Accountability, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1443, 1455–58 (2003).
72. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 39, at 122–24 (describing three studies); see also
Daniel A. Krauss, John G. McCabe & Joel D. Lieberman, Dangerously Confused?
Jurors’ Reactions to Expert Testimony on Dangerousness in a Sexually Violent Predator
Trial, 36 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. (forthcoming 2012) (reporting a study finding that jurors
were more likely to be influenced by less scientific expert testimony).
73. Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 40–41 (1996) (finding that even robust crossexamination and rebuttal information do not undermine clinical prediction testimony to
the effect that the defendant is dangerous).
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and it is very useful in developing risk management plans once preventive
detention or an indeterminate sentence is authorized.74 But because in its
unvalidated form it generates only information about risk management, it
does not provide the court with an empirically based assessment of an
individual’s degree of risk.
Only actuarial-based predictions provide the latter type of information.
Although data about groups cannot provide provably accurate information
about individual risk levels, that conceptual conundrum does not change
the well-documented fact that actuarial prediction produces relatively
low false positive and false negative rates and favorable AUC values of
.7 to .8.75 Furthermore, as developed below, even SPJ and clinical
assessments are ultimately based on assumptions about individuals
developed from study of or experience with other individuals, so those
methods of assessment do not avoid the group-to-individual prediction
problem. When the issue at hand is whether the state may deprive an
individual of liberty, actuarial risk assessment provides the most
probative and least prejudicial information.
Accordingly, in those cases where the government must prove risk in
order to incarcerate, it should be required to rely on statistical probability
estimates based on actuarial evaluation procedures or structured
professional judgment instruments that have been similarly tested, unless
it can show that such estimates are not possible. The latter situation might
arise for at least two reasons. First, actuarial instruments might not be
properly validated; the VRAG was initially devised based on studies of
predominantly white Canadians and thus, until it had been crossvalidated on various other populations, was of limited use.76 Second,
statistical estimates might be based on outcome variables that are of
questionable worth in court. For instance, the researchers who developed
74. See generally Lorraine Johnstone, Assessing and Managing Violent Youth:
Implications for Sentencing, in DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE
123, 126 (Bernadette McSherry & Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011) (describing various uses of
structured professional judgment).
75. Douglas Mossman, The Imperfection of Protection Through Detection and
Intervention: Lessons from Three Decades of Research on the Psychiatric Assessment of
Violence Risk, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 132 (2009).
76. Marnie E. Rice, Grant T. Harris & N. Zoe Hilton, The Violence Risk Appraisal
Guide and Sex Offender Risk Appraisal Guide for Violence Risk Assessment and the
Ontario Domestic Assault Risk Assessment and Domestic Violence Risk Appraisal Guide
for Wife Assault Risk Assessment, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT 99, 105
(Randy K. Otto & Kevin S. Douglas eds., 2010) (describing subsequent validation
studies in the United States and Europe).
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the VRAG defined the term violent recidivism to include two simple
assaults within a seven-year period.77 This information is arguably
irrelevant in both a death penalty proceeding, which ought to be focused
on seriously violent recidivism, and a civil commitment proceeding, which
ought to be focused on imminent harm. In these types of situations, judges
might decide to exclude actuarial prediction testimony.
Even if relevant actuarial information is unavailable, however,
government should not be permitted to use clinical prediction testimony
in its place, given the reliability and prejudice problems noted above.
Rather, the court should consider two options. The first option is simply
to find that the state cannot prove its case with admissible evidence. The
second is to permit the state to prove risk based on prior antisocial
behavior of a type that is relevant to the proceeding. If a risk assessment
must be made in the absence of statistical probability estimates, prior
behavior provides the most probative method of providing evidence of
risk.78
F. Individualization: The Subject-First Rule
Assume now that the government has proven the requisite degree of
risk with statistically based probability estimates. Certainly, the offender or
respondent—henceforth called the “subject” of the preventive detention
proceeding—can respond in kind. But the subject should also be able to
respond with clinical prediction testimony, despite the more questionable
probative value of that type of evidence. Predictions based on clinical
assessment are still, on average, better than chance selection and thus
have some probative value.79 Furthermore, actuarial-based probability
estimates often do not capture all of the individual protective factors that
might reduce risk, which clinical prediction testimony can provide. Most
importantly, clinical prediction testimony presented by the defense does
not have the potentially prejudicial impact that such testimony has when
it is presented by the government. The defense position on risk at a
77. Id. at 102.
78. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm
Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 423 (2006) (stating, with
respect to prior criminal history, that “no risk factor has been more thoroughly studied
and none ha[s] generated more reliable results”). Monahan goes on to argue that, in the
sentencing context, risk assessments should be based solely on past criminal acts. See id.
at 427–28. That argument is addressed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying
notes 113–17. For now, it can simply be noted that “as a practical matter, it is hardly
protective of the individual’s interests to make prediction a sentencing issue and then
deny the factfinder the best means of making the prediction.” SLOBOGIN, supra note 39,
at 114.
79. Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About
Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 789 (1994).
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sentencing or commitment hearing is that the subject will not repeat
what the judge or jury has just decided the subject recently did. Under
such circumstances, defense testimony about risk is not likely to
overinfluence the jury and should be admissible whether relying on
actuarial, structured professional judgment or unstructured clinical
assessment.
Thus, the courts should consider adopting a “subject-first” rule with
respect to clinical prediction evidence. Generally, this type of evidence
should not be admissible. But if the subject wants to use such evidence
in an effort to individualize the prediction, he or she should be allowed
to do so. At that point, the prosecution should be able to respond in
kind. This proposal is analogous to the familiar character evidence rule that
prohibits, out of fear it will otherwise prejudice the factfinder, prosecution
introduction of prior bad acts unless and until the defense “opens the
door” by introducing evidence of good character.80
G. Procedures: Periodic Review and Due Process
In order to ensure that the risk-proportionality and least drastic means
principles are implemented properly, preventive regimes must routinely
reconsider both the nature of the risk posed by individuals detained and
whether their current disposition is necessary to achieve the government’s
goals—the latter an inquiry that includes an assessment of whether
alternative treatment regimes would be more effective at reducing
recidivism. Hendricks made clear that such periodic review is required
for preventive regimes outside the criminal justice system.81 This
requirement should also be imposed on prevention decisions within the
criminal process for the same reasons. Decisions about pretrial detention
and indeterminate sentences both need to be revisited on a frequent basis
to ensure adherence to the risk-proportionality and least drastic means
principles and to ascertain the effects of risk management.
As to the procedures that should apply in initial and periodic review
hearings, one central point about the applicable American law must be
emphasized. The Sixth Amendment’s guarantees that the accused shall
be afforded notice, counsel, confrontation rights, and public jury
decisionmaking apply only in “criminal prosecutions.”82 However, the
80.
81.
82.

FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S 346, 363–64 (1997).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments’ stipulations that deprivations of life
or liberty may not occur in the absence of due process of law apply to all
proceedings, criminal and civil. Depending on the circumstances, due
process may impose some or all Sixth Amendment-type rights on
prevention proceedings.83
At the same time, due process analysis is flexible. Sixth Amendment
doctrine requires that all criminal prosecutions provide the rights it lists,
and Fifth Amendment doctrine prohibits compulsion of testimony in all
“criminal cases.” The overall goal under the Due Process Clause, in
contrast, is to create a fair, accurate, and efficient process, which means
that experimentation with various procedural frameworks is permissible
in noncriminal cases.84 Thus, to the extent sentencing is not considered
part of the “criminal prosecution” or the “criminal case,” it can be a forum
for trying out diverse procedural mechanisms. Given the technical
nature of risk assessment, the criminal procedure right most vulnerable
to relaxation in sentencing and noncriminal proceedings is the right to
adjudication by jury.85 It is also noteworthy that the Fifth Amendment
right to remain silent probably does not apply in full force at sentencing86
and does not apply at all outside the criminal context.87 Given its
negative impact on factfinding, the ability to refuse to answer questions
without any repercussions—such as drawing adverse inferences from
silence—may not be an essential aspect of due process in these
proceedings.88
A third procedural mechanism that probably would have to disappear
in a regime focused on risk is plea bargaining. Because neither the judge
nor the prosecutor would control an indeterminate sentence, the
prosecutor would not be able to promise a reduced term in exchange for
83. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 30–59 (1967) (holding that, under the Due
Process Clause, juveniles tried as delinquents are entitled to notice, counsel, the right to
confront accusers, the right to remain silent, a transcript of the proceedings, and the right
to appeal).
84. See generally Mark R. Fondacaro, Christopher Slobogin & Tricia Cross,
Reconceptualizing Due Process in Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social
Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 967–71 (2006).
85. Although the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt all facts that extend the
sentence beyond the statutory maximum, any sentence within the maximum or any
indeterminate sentence is not affected by this holding. See Michael W. McConnell, The
Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 666–67 (2006).
86. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (reserving the question
of whether silence can be used as evidence of lack of remorse or unwillingness to accept
responsibility at sentencing hearings).
87. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 374 (1986) (holding that there is no right to
remain silent in SVP proceedings).
88. For elaboration of this point and other possible procedural variations, see
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN & MARK R. FONDACARO, JUVENILES AT RISK: A PLEA FOR
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 95–121 (2011).
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a guilty plea, making traditional bargaining impossible. Many observers
of the criminal justice system would welcome the abolition of this
subterranean justice system, where dispositions are negotiated between
the prosecutor and defense counsel outside the presence of judge, jury,
and the defendant, often in violation of both desert and consequentialist
agendas.89 But others might worry that a system in which outcomes in
criminal cases could not be negotiated would collapse. This seems unlikely,
however. Many offenders in a risk-based system might be willing to
plead guilty or provide the government information about coperpetrators in
the hope that their action will tend to show remorse and a willingness to
reform, traits that are directly relevant to risk assessment.90 A good portion
of those who do not plead guilty could still be convicted relatively
easily. In most cases, the litigated issues would surround the risk
determinations described above, not guilt or innocence, and would occur
at sentencing, not trial.
H. Summary: Application to Sentencing
The government may restrict a person’s liberty for the purpose of
detention only under the following conditions: First, it must demonstrate
that the person has been convicted of a crime or has engaged in
imminently risky conduct. Second, both before the initial intervention
and periodically thereafter, the government must demonstrate, at
proceedings consistent with procedural due process, that the intervention
is both proportionate to the probability and magnitude of the risk, as
proven by appropriately normed probability estimates, and the least
drastic means of achieving the government’s prevention goal. Finally,
when the intervention occurs outside the criminal justice system, the
government must prove that the person is very unlikely to be deterred
even by the prospect of serious criminal punishment.
All of these principles find antecedents in American constitutional
law. They also can be derived from an analogy to justification doctrine
in criminal law, which provides a defense to conduct that would
otherwise be a crime if it is the most effective and parsimonious means
89. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J.
1979, 2000–09 (1992).
90. This appears to be the practice in the juvenile justice system, where leniency
based on expressions of remorse, lessons learned, and acceptance of responsibility is
standard. See Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of
Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 302 (2006).
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of protecting oneself or others from a harm that is greater than the
offense.91 Preventive intervention based on the best possible risk
assessment and limited to dispositions that are both proportionate to the
risk posed and the least drastic means of forestalling it is consistent with
a broad choice-of-evils notion.
If the foregoing analysis makes sense, a sentencing regime focused on
prevention must honor: (1) the principle of legality, (2) the riskproportionality principle, (3) the least drastic means principle, (4) the
principle of criminal justice primacy, (5) the evidentiary requirement that
the government prove its case using actuarial-based probability estimates
or, in their absence, previous antisocial conduct, (6) the subject-first rule,
and (7) the procedural principle that a subject’s risk and risk management
plans periodically be reviewed using procedures consistent with due
process. Application of these principles would result in a system of
indeterminate criminal dispositions structured along the following lines.
First, of course, sentencing must be preceded by conviction of an
offense, which would satisfy the principle of legality—principle one—
and would also render moot principle four, because preventive detention
would take place within the criminal justice system. 92 Second, the
nature and duration of the sentence imposed after the conviction would
depend, under principles two and three, upon the probability and magnitude
of the risk posed by the offender and the means available to diminish the
risk. Relying on risk-proportionality reasoning, initial confinement on
preventive grounds might be limited to situations where the state can
prove the offender poses a greater than 50% risk of a serious offense, and
even then only if no less restrictive means—ankle monitors, intensive
probation, notification and registration requirements—can achieve the
state’s prevention aim. A lower probability or lower magnitude risk should
at most permit monitoring in the community, and even if confinement is
initially authorized, under risk-proportionality reasoning it could continue
only if increasingly greater risk is demonstrated. Regardless of the
setting, principle three also requires that the state provide treatment that
can reduce risk of further offending and thus render less restrictive the
preventive intervention.
91. Various commentators have made this comparison, although they have limited
the scope of preventive actions permitted by the justification analogy to a greater extent
than I do here. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, A Unified Excuse of Preemptive Self-Protection, 74
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1475, 1477 (1999); Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution,
Preventive Detention, and the Tort/Crime Distinction, 76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 160–61 (1996).
Furthermore, the analogy is imperfect because here the state, operating in deliberation,
rather than the individual, operating in the heat of the moment, is carrying out the
preventive action.
92. In contrast to post-sentence commitment, about which more is said below. See
infra Part III.F.
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Principles five and six work in tandem in structuring how the government
can meet the all-important proof requirements outlined above. Principle
five states that the government’s case-in-chief in cases seeking
incarceration must rely on actuarial risk assessment instruments in proving
the probability and magnitude of risk, primarily because other means of
proving risk, such as unstructured and structured clinical judgment, do
not provide numerical probability estimates and tend to be both less
accurate and more likely to mislead the factfinder. However, in recognition
of the fact that actuarial instruments are based on group characteristics,
principle six permits the offender to contest the actuarial probability
estimate with an individualized clinical risk assessment, with the caveat
that the government may respond in kind.
Finally, principle seven requires that the proof process at sentencing
be consistent with due process requirements, which at a minimum
should probably include the rights to a neutral factfinder, counsel, and
confrontation of the state’s evidence, as well as an explanation of
the ultimate decision and the right to appeal that decision, at least when
there is no consensus during the initial review.93 Principle seven further
requires that a similar process take place at regular intervals to ensure
adherence to the risk-proportionality and least drastic means principles.
These periodic hearings presumably would often result in changes in the
nature and duration of the intervention, including conditional and outright
release, sometimes before and sometimes after expiration of the sentence
that would have been imposed had desert been the guiding dispositional
principle.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCING
This outline of a principled approach to indeterminate sentencing
suffices for the present purpose of responding to several objections to
sentencing regimes that are based on risk assessments. In the order

93. The relevant Supreme Court decisions are Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973), and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), which set out due process rights
in probation and parole revocation proceedings. Both cases emphasized that the complexity
of the proceedings is a significant determinant of whether these rights should be extended to a
particular proceeding. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786–87; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487–89.
Risk assessments probably fall in the “complex” category. It has also been suggested that
judges be involved in back-end decisionmaking. See, e.g., Cecelia Klingele, Changing the
Sentence Without Hiding the Truth: Judicial Sentence Modification as a Promising
Method of Early Release, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 465, 536 (2010).
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addressed here, those objections are that indeterminate sentencing:
(1) relies on inaccurate predictions, (2) is unjust, (3) denies dignity to the
offender, (4) fails to vindicate the victim, (5) provides an insufficient
deterrent effect among potential criminals, (6) reduces respect for and
compliance with the law among normally law-abiding individuals, (7) is
too optimistic about rehabilitative programs, (8) is too costly, (9) tends
to produce unequal treatment, demoralization, and cynicism among
offenders, and (10) as a result of a number of these concerns, is
unconstitutional. This is a daunting array of objections, but they can all
be answered in ways that reinforce the value of indeterminate sentencing
and diminish the attractiveness of determinate sentencing, limiting
retributivist sentencing, and post-sentence commitment.
A. Objection 1: Indeterminate Sentencing and Inaccuracy
Risk assessment is an inexact science. The probability estimates
produced by actuarial instruments and other types of prediction methods
are suspect for a number of reasons. They may not be validated on a
population similar to the offender in question and thus may overstate or
understate the risk potential that a more precisely validated instrument
would produce. They may be based on faulty algorithms. They may be
misapplied, especially to the extent they rely on badly kept records, biased
information from third parties, or subjective determinations such as
diagnoses. Even if correctly constructed and applied, many of the statistical
risk categories these actuarial instruments identify fall below the 50%
level needed to justify initial confinement under the proposed proof
requirements and thus might create pressure on experts and factfinders to
bend the probability estimates in cases that are close to the margin.94
All of this is correctable of course.95 Just as importantly, those who
point out these flaws in risk assessment seldom compare them with the
inaccuracy associated with the culpability assessment mandated by
sentencing in determinate and limited retributivism regimes. According
to the American Law Institute, this assessment requires accurate

94. For general discussion of the problems associated with actuarial prediction, see
Donna Cropp Bechman, Sex Offender Civil Commitments: Scientists or Psychics?, CRIM.
JUST., Summer 2011, at 24, and John F. Edens et al., Predictions of Future Dangerousness in
Capital Murder Trials: Is It Time To “Disinvent the Wheel?,” 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
55 (2005).
95. For an optimistic view about risk assessment from a previously hostile observer,
see Jonathan Simon, Reversal of Fortune: The Resurgence of Individual Risk Assessment
in Criminal Justice, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 397, 411–14 (2005), which views
positively the improved science behind risk assessment and the ability of actuarial
instruments to provide probability estimates in lieu of dichotomous dangerousness
assessments.
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information about three criteria: the relative gravity of the offense, the
harm done to the victim, and the blameworthiness of the offender.96
None of these criteria is amenable to scientific measurement. Offense
gravity, victim injury, and blameworthiness can all be ranked in an ordinal
fashion, but consensus about the precise punishment range, particularly
if the three variables are considered simultaneously, is probably
impossible to achieve.97 Even if consensus can be reached, defining the
relevant terms and applying them consistently is a gargantuan task, as any
criminal law professor knows.98 Particularly difficult in this regard is
obtaining a reliable determination of offender blameworthiness, which,
at a minimum, requires discerning the offender’s mental state at the time
of the offense and probably also requires an assessment of character.99
Past mental states are notoriously difficult to discern,100 even by the
defendant, much less lay factfinders, and the possible permutations
of character are endless.
As a result of all of this, sentences based on retribution are rife with
“inaccuracy.” Two offenders sentenced according to desert can receive
wildly different sentences in different jurisdictions, and perhaps even in
the same jurisdiction, depending—perhaps but not always—on the
degree of victim injury, the age of the victim, and the prior record of the
96. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007),
discussed in Slobogin, supra note 7, at 670.
97. Christopher Slobogin, Some Hypotheses About Empirical Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1189, 1191–93 (2011) (describing data supporting this point); Christopher Slobogin
& Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place (forthcoming 2012) (describing
research showing tremendous variation in assignments of punishment, whether based
solely on desert or on desert and utilitarian principles).
98. A recent study found that even when lay persons are given very clear
instructions and asked to apply them to scenarios described in terms of the language of
those instructions, almost all have great difficulty distinguishing “knowledge” from
“recklessness,” and over 40% could not distinguish “negligence” from other mental
states. Frances X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2011) (manuscript at 44–46).
99. Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937) (“For the
determination of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than the
particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be taken into account
the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the
offender.”).
100. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 39, at 42–48 (detailing reasons why mental states
are so hard to decipher). As Deborah Denno states, “[W]hat people intend, think, and
believe are paramount to assessing guilt; in some cases, they can mean the difference
between life and death. How odd for a legal system to base so much on something about
which it seems to know so little.” Deborah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian
World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 605 (2005).
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offender. For many types of crimes, huge sentencing differentials depend
upon whether a person acts with “premeditation” or instead merely
“intended” the act, or acted “recklessly” instead of “negligently,” despite
the difficulty of defining the relevant terms and ascertaining what was
going on inside a person’s head at the time of the crime. The assertion
that any given sentence is the “correct” one from a retributive perspective is
merely guesswork, and one could even say a gesture of enormous chutzpah.
To take one example of this phenomenon from among hundreds of
thousands of examples, consider the remarks of one author writing about
a man suffering from schizophrenia who killed a young woman. In the
author’s opinion, the six-year sentence that was imposed in this case
“seems both respectful of [the offender] as a moral agent and at the same
time sympathetic to him due to his mental illness.”101 The sentiment
behind this statement is understandable and the reasoning not implausible.
But one could also argue that because the killing was intentional, the
offender’s motive was anger, and the offender hid the victim’s body
after the killing, greater punishment was “deserved.” Alternatively, one
could argue that because the offender was seriously mentally ill, the
morally appropriate result was, instead, acquittal by reason of insanity.
As the author candidly states, “Perhaps in the future if we learn more
clearly the relationship between mental illness and volition, we may
come to a different judgment . . . . [b]ut, judged by our imperfect knowledge
of this relationship,” the sentence “seems appropriate.”102 To base a sixyear deprivation of liberty on “imperfect knowledge” and on what “seems
appropriate” is unavoidable in a retributive regime and therefore probably
justifiable. But it can hardly be called an outcome that is correct “beyond a
reasonable doubt” or by any other measure.
As I have said elsewhere, “If we are willing to countenance these
harsh penalty differentials based on such a high degree of uncertainty,
we may be hard pressed to criticize a preventive detention regime on
unreliability grounds.”103 In a recent article, Denise Meyerson has contested
this type of comparative argument. While accepting that inaccuracy is
inevitable in either type of system, she contends that the probabilistic
nature of retributive judgments is more palatable than the probabilistic
nature of risk assessments because the two types of inaccuracy are different
in kind.104 Attributions of guilt, she asserts, tend to be “individualized”
because they are based on a causal link to one or more “internal” factors
101. William T. Pizzi, Colorado v. Connelly: What Really Happened, 7 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 377, 389 (2009).
102. Id.
103. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 110.
104. Denise Meyerson, Risks, Rights, Statistics and Compulsory Measures, 31
SYDNEY L. REV. 507, 512 (2009).
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directly associated with the offender, such as motive or, as in the case
above, anger and mental illness.105 Assessments of risk, in contrast, are
“nakedly statistical,” in that they are based on “external” data generated
from study of other individuals and transformed into risk factors such as
criminal history, diagnosis, and gender of the victim.106 Even if such a
risk assessment places an individual in a group 75% of whom will
reoffend, Meyerson states, “strictly speaking it does not make sense
to say of any particular individual [in that group] that he or she has a
75 per cent risk of re-offending or that he or she is likely to reoffend.”107 Such predictions are based on “data about classes of people
which are insensitive to relevant but unknown differences among the
individuals in that class.”108 A given individual either will or will not
reoffend, for a complex set of reasons, only some of which are captured
in a risk assessment. Thus, even though retributive judgments are also
based on probabilities and can often be wrong, Meyerson states, they are
more acceptable than predictive judgments.
This critique, long recognized by others,109 mischaracterizes both
culpability and risk assessments. Culpability assessments, particularly
when focused on mental states as opposed to whether the offender
committed the actus reus, are also often based on nomothetic information.
In the murder case mentioned above, for instance, the determination
about how much punishment is deserved will depend upon one’s
subjective views about the definition and effects of anger and mental
illness, based on general impressions of how those conditions operate.
The fact that the law allows juries to draw an inference that one intends
the natural consequences of one’s actions is an explicit recognition that
stereotypes can affect culpability decisions.110 And despite the fact that
an offender either did or did not offend with the requisite mental state,
the law allows these types of probabilistic assessments to inform sentencing.
Conversely, risk assessment is not necessarily lacking in “individualized”
determinations. The more sophisticated actuarial instruments contain a
105. Id. at 517–19.
106. Id. at 515 (citing David Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 YALE L.J. 601
(1980) (book review)).
107. Id. at 521.
108. Id. at 522.
109. Similar arguments are canvassed in P AUL E. M EEHL , C LINICAL VERSUS
STATISTICAL PREDICTION: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
20–22 (1954).
110. See United States v. Martin, 772 F.2d 1442, 1446 (8th Cir. 1985).
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large number of risk factors requiring an assessment of the offender’s
personality, behavior, and demographic traits, all of which are linked not
just empirically but logically and possibly causally to recidivism
potential.111 Furthermore, under principle six noted above, offenders have
the right to individualize the assessment further by proffering clinical
prediction testimony.
In the end, the key difference between the probabilities associated
with culpability judgments and the probabilities associated with risk
assessment is that the latter assessments are, as Meyerson states,
“naked”—but only in the literal sense rather than the metaphorical sense
in which she uses that word. The numerical probability estimates provided
by actuarial instruments flaunt in our faces how bad we are at making
the judgments associated with risk. But the fact that our failure in the
predictive context can be quantified should not hide the countervailing
fact that we are no better at making subjective postdictive judgments.
The difficulties of proving risk and culpability do differ, however,
with respect to the consequences of a mistake. Although it is often said
that it is better to let ten guilty men go free than to convict one innocent
person, that calculus probably should change if we have good reason to
know that a good proportion of the guilty will, if released, go on to cause
serious harm to others.112 In other words, false negatives in risk assessment
are arguably much more costly than false negatives in culpability
assessment. At the same time, the cost of a false positive may not be as
great in the former instance as in the latter because, under principle
four’s least drastic means requirement, confinement will occur less often
and because, under principle seven’s periodic review requirement, mistakes
are at least susceptible to discovery.
B. Objection 2: Indeterminate Sentencing and Justice
Another way risk assessment differs from culpability assessment
relates not to accuracy but to less tangible moral values. Although
culpability assessments are commonly based on what a person did at the
time of the crime—and perhaps during previous crimes as well—risk
assessments are more likely to be based, at least in part, on factors over
which an individual has relatively less control. Under American
constitutional law, demographic traits other than race can probably be
predicates for prediction.113 But one might still condemn as unfair

111. See Rice, Harris & Hilton, supra note 76, at 99–115.
112. Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem
of Preventive Detention, J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 793 (1996).
113. Monahan, supra note 78, at 430–32.
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confinement of an individual based on immutable or static characteristics
such as age, gender, and childhood history, factors that often play a
substantial role in evaluations of risk.114 Even some risk factors over
which a person has some control, such as being jobless or single, could
be considered improper bases for intervention because in themselves
they are not remotely criminal in nature. Thus, some have argued that
any form of detention based on risk is unjust,115 while others have
contended that only preventive detention based on prior criminal history,
to which moral blame can be attributed, is appropriate.116
There is no doubt that offenders do not deserve aggravated sentences
simply because they are young, unemployed, and suffered abuse as
children, nor do they deserve lesser sentences because they are older,
have steady jobs, and enjoyed carefree upbringings. If anything, the
desert calculus in these cases should be reversed, to the extent culpability
can be diminished because of youthful heedlessness and straightened
circumstances or enhanced because of a decision to commit crime despite
advantages. Even if risk assessment is based entirely on prior criminal
history, the resulting sentence will bear little resemblance to a sentence
based on the multiple offender’s desert. The latter type of sentence will
attempt to be proportionate to the nose-thumbing evil the new offense
represents rather than to the risk the old offenses forecast.
In short, if criminal justice is defined solely in terms of retribution, then
risk-based indeterminate sentencing—and post-sentence commitment—is
unjustifiable. So is a sentence imposed under limiting retributivism
theory because any adjustment to the length of the sentence within the
retributive range is based on factors relating to risk, not desert; indeed,
as suggested above, it will probably be inversely related to desert. That
leaves determinate sentencing as the only just dispositional method.

114. See, e.g., Kirk Heilbrun, Kento Yasuhara & Sanjay Shah, Violence Risk
Assessment Tools: Overview and Critical Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF VIOLENCE RISK
ASSESSMENT, supra note 76, at 1, 9 & tbl.1.2 (listing common risk factors).
115. Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics To Sentence Individual Criminals: An
Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 699, 706–20 (2007) (“[I]n light of the ethical concerns, any jurisdiction
seeking to impose either risk-based prediction or demographic-based sentencing must
find a considerable crime-fighting benefit.”).
116. Monahan, supra note 78, at 428 (“Past criminal behavior is the only scientifically
valid risk factor for violence that unambiguously implicates blameworthiness, and therefore
the only one that should enter the jurisprudential calculus in criminal sentencing.”).
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That conclusion makes sense, however, only if we allow retributivists
to hijack the word justice. Justice does not have to be defined solely in
terms of blameworthiness and offense gravity. Determinate sentencing
is unjust to the victim of an offender who has been released prematurely,
as well as to the prematurely released offender who must now suffer
avoidable punishment for a crime the offender would not have committed
had detention and treatment continued. It is also unjust to the contrite
offender who is ready to be law-abiding but must serve out the sentence
he or she “deserves.” In both of the latter two situations, the state is
disserving the offender, whose liberty interests desert theorists are
purportedly trying to protect. Furthermore, blameworthiness, as
retributivists conceive it, is not irrelevant in an indeterminate sentencing
regime. The requirement of a conviction for an offense requiring at least
a negligence mens rea ensures that the offender has committed a morally
culpable act. Most importantly, though individual risk factors may have
little or nothing to do with blameworthiness, they are marshaled in an
effort to predict blameworthy conduct—a crime chosen by the individual.117
In at least some cases, desert and prevention goals may be reconcilable in
a way that implements both forms of justice. To the extent possible, for
instance, preventive dispositions should be fashioned with their degree
of “punitive bite” in mind.118 Similarly, parole can be granted or denied
based on conduct in prison—in terms of adhering both to prison rules
and to rehabilitation goals that address underlying risk factors—with the
dual purpose of communicating to the prisoner society’s approval or
condemnation of the conduct and of preventing or discouraging further
antisocial conduct.119

117. Some who subsequently commit crime might not be blameworthy. Cf. Lippke,
supra note 49, at 399–400 (suggesting that the individuals who are so dangerous as to
warrant preventive confinement might also lack responsibility for their behavior). In
such cases, preventive detention is permissible even under most desert-based views. See
supra text accompanying note 61.
118. Cf. Ben M. Crouch, Is Incarceration Really Worse? Analysis of Offenders’
Preferences for Prison over Probation, 10 JUST. Q. 67, 79 tbl.2 (1993) (assessing a
survey of Texas inmates indicating that two-thirds preferred one year in prison to ten
years of probation, and the other third equated one year in prison to three years of
probation); Robert E. Harlow, John M. Darley & Paul H. Robinson, The Severity of
Intermediate Penal Sanctions: A Psychophysical Scaling Approach for Obtaining
Community Perceptions, 11 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 71, 85 tbl.II (1995) (evaluating
punitive bite of various intermediate sanctions).
119. Cf. Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A New Theory of Indeterminate
Sentencing, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (proposing a rationale for
indeterminate sentencing along these lines).
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C. Objections 3 and 4: Indeterminate Sentencing and
Offender-Victim Dignity
Because indeterminate sentences are based on risk rather than culpability,
another concern is that they denigrate the dignity of the offender and the
victim. Herbert Morris, for instance, insisted that desert-based punishment
is necessary to affirm the responsibility, and therefore the humanity, of
the person who violates the law.120 Jean Hampton argued that desertbased punishment is required to affirm the victim’s worth.121 Antony
Duff has similarly focused on the “communicative purpose” of punishment;
to him, punishment is a necessary expression of “what we, as a polity,
owe to victims, to offenders, and to ourselves as a political community”
as well as an effort to further the offender’s “moral rehabilitation”
through persuasion as opposed to brute control.122
The fact that an indeterminate sentence must be preceded by a
conviction that announces the offender’s moral culpability may meet the
goals expressed by Morris, Hampton, and Duff.123 The verdict tells the
offender, the victim, and society at large that the offender has been
found accountable. If it is still felt that sentencing must also serve that
function, a closer look at how indeterminate sentencing works should
allay concerns about whether it adequately attends to offender dignity
and victim vindication (the impact of indeterminate sentencing on
societal views is considered in Part III.D).
As a matter of constitutional law, an indeterminate sentence must
include treatment designed to reduce risk—or to use modern nomenclature,
a risk-needs management program—that will concomitantly reduce the
duration of the intervention. Otherwise, the least drastic means principle
would be violated.124 Risk management can take a number of different
forms. But a consistent feature of any such program is that it stresses
offender responsibility for criminal actions, in a much more direct
manner than a pronouncement by a judge that the offender deserves a
120. HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY
AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 46 (1976).
121. Jean Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 111, 125
(1988).
122. R.A. DUFF, PUNISHMENT, COMMUNICATION, AND COMMUNITY 80 (2001); R.A.
Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1182–83 (2005).
123. Andrew von Hirsch, an avowed retributivist, has written that a fine might
convey sufficient censure for murder. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
38 (1993).
124. See supra notes 41–49 and accompanying text.
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particular sentence for what he or she has done. For instance, in the sex
offender context, a very common risk management technique is cognitive
behavior therapy, which stresses the offender’s ability to change behavior
through cognitive restructuring and avoiding risky situations.125 The
primary message of this type of therapy is that actions have consequences
and that offenders are accountable for those consequences. As one
article described this type of therapy,
Treatment focuses on reducing denial and cognitive distortions or minimizations,
which are the rationalizations that offenders use to justify and maintain their
behavior . . . . [and also] attempts to develop victim empathy within the offender
under the assumption that recognition of victim impact will serve as a motivator
to avoid future offending behavior.126

As this last comment indicates, risk management programs do not
ignore the victim’s concerns either. Indeed, compared to determinate
sentencing, where the victim is forgotten once sentence is imposed—and
perhaps even before that point—risk management often incorporates
victims into the dispositional process. The best known method of doing
so is most commonly called “restorative justice,” a term meant to
describe an array of programs that include offender-victim mediation
and offender apology and restitution.127 Restorative justice not only is
designed to reduce offenders’ risk by impressing upon them the palpable
harm they have caused and facilitating their reintegration into the
community but also is meant to empower the victim by allowing him or
her to confront the offender and perhaps even to help fashion disposition.128

125. Aviva Moster, Dorota W. Wnuk & Elizabeth L. Jeglic, Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy Interventions with Sex Offenders, 14 J. CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE 109, 111–
12, 117–18 (2008).
126. Judith V. Becker & William D. Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know
About Assessing and Treating Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 116, 128
(1998).
127. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION (1989)
(discussing the framework and theory of reintegrative shaming as a way to control
crime).
128. Carter Hay & Mark Stafford, Rehabilitation in America: The Philosophy and
Methods, from Past to Present, in PUNISHING JUVENILES: PRINCIPLE AND CRITIQUE 67, 79
(Ido Weijers & Antony Duff eds., 2002) (“[A] punishment-based system . . . ignores the
financial, physical and emotional losses that victims have suffered. . . . Restorative
justice [in contrast, stresses that] justice is served only when offenders provide victims
with restitution that returns them to the greatest extent possible to their original
circumstances.” (citation omitted)).
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D. Objections 5 and 6: Indeterminate Sentencing, Deterrence,
and Norm Compliance
One might assume that if potential offenders know that any sentence
they receive will be indeterminate rather than a time certain, they may be
more likely to roll the antisocial dice. In fact, the effect of criminal law
doctrine on crime is much more complex. Research strongly suggests
that for most offenders concern about punishment has very little impact
on the decision to commit crime.129 As one study of imprisoned offenders
found, the vast majority of criminals “are impervious to harsher
punishments because no feasible detection rate or punishment scheme
would arrest the impelling forces behind their behaviors, which might
include drugs, fight-or-flight responses, or irrational thought.”130
To the extent criminal sanctions are able to buy deterrence,
indeterminate sentencing may even maximize it. Potential first time
offenders cannot know ahead of time either the nature or the duration of
their disposition if convicted, an uncertainty that could increase reluctance
to commit crime.131 In the meantime, potential reoffenders, if they think
about punishment at all, will probably guess—often correctly—that the
government’s response to new crimes will be progressively tougher,
which should also enhance deterrence.132
The deterrence objection to indeterminate sentencing is closely related
to the concern alluded to above that it undermines the expressive
function of the criminal law. As Henry Hart put it years ago, a criminal
justice system based on prevention rather than desert might “undermine
129. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Role of Deterrence in the
Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst when Doing Its Best, 91 GEO. L.J. 949,
976–89 (2003) (giving conceptual and empirical reasons for questioning deterrence).
130. David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the
Pickpocket’s Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 308 (2002). Even reviews that take
a more positive view of deterrence research admit that the crime reduction benefits of
punishment are often “minute” and in any event “context specific.” Robert Apel & Daniel S.
Nagin, General Deterrence: A Review of Recent Evidence, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY
411, 416, 423, 425 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011).
131. See Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of Uncertainty in
Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 445–46 (2004); Dan M. Kahan,
Ignorance of Law Is an Excuse—But Only for the Virtuous, 96 MICH. L. REV. 127, 137–
41 (1997) (discussing “prudent obfuscation” and vague terminology as a means of
fostering law-abiding behavior).
132. Naomi Harlin Goodno, Career Criminals Targeted: The Verdict Is In, California’s
Three Strikes Law Proves Effective, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 461, 469–71 (2007)
(describing studies purporting to find that California’s three-strikes law has had a
significant deterrent effect).

1163

SLOBOGIN POST-AUTHOR PAGES FINAL TO PRINT (DO NOT DELETE)

1/3/2012 4:43 PM

the foundation of a free society’s effort to build up each individual’s
sense of responsibility as a guide and a stimulus to the constructive
development of his capacity for effectual and fruitful decision.”133
A more instrumental argument along these lines, made by Paul Robinson
and John Darley, is that if sentences depart dramatically or consistently
from consensus views on the punishment that is deserved, people will
lose respect for the law and perhaps even become more willing to
disobey it.134 Both of these points suggest that indeterminate sentences
could lead to more criminal activity among the general population, not
just among those who are intrinsically predisposed to antisocial behavior
but also among those who are typically law-abiding.
A system that did not visit any sanction on those who commit crime,
or that routinely released serious offenders after a short time and
confined minor offenders for prolonged periods, might well produce the
hypothesized effects. But there is virtually no empirical support for the
position that an indeterminate sentencing regime of the type proposed
here would foster noncompliance with the law. 135 Certainly the
indeterminate regimes that have existed throughout the first threequarters of the twentieth century have not been associated with lessened
deterrence, a loosening of society’s moral structure, or greater disdain
for the law and government authorities. It is also worth noting that the
criminal law is only a minor player in shaping societal character; family,
peers, schools, churches, and various other institutions are much more
likely to function in such a role.136
Nonetheless, the concerns discussed here may require sentences
longer than those strictly necessary as a prevention measure, in two
situations. First, it may turn out, contrary to the assertions just made,
that indeterminate sentencing in its pure form is so poor at capturing the
urge to condemn that noncompliance, even by normally law-abiding
133. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 401, 410 (1958).
134. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 456 (1997) (“[A] distributive theory that tracks the community’s perceived
principles of justice has a greater power to gain compliance with society’s rules of lawful
conduct.”).
135. Compare Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin & Michael D. Reisig, The
Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 2003, 2007 (2010) (finding a statistically
significant but small noncompliance effect when sentences are drastically “unjust”), and
Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1414–16, 1423–24 (2005)
(similar findings), with Slobogin & Brinkley-Rubinstein, supra note 97, at 43 (stating,
based on four studies, that noncompliance effects appear to be weak and that, in any event,
they “dissipate quickly over time”). Perhaps also relevant here are findings that
offenders often prefer prison to probation. See Crouch, supra note 118, at 85–86.
136. See Robert F. Meier & Weldon T. Johnson, Deterrence as Social Control: The
Legal and Extralegal Production of Conformity, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 292, 302 (1977).
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citizens, increases. If so, legislatures could authorize and courts could
impose high sentencing maxima, graded among crimes according to
desert. This arrangement would probably satisfy expressive retributive
urges but at the same time allow earlier release if a risk assessment so
dictates; it would also allay the concerns of those worried about de facto
lifetime confinement based on risk assessments uncapped by any
dispositional limitation. Second, when they know risk is the sole focus
of sentencing, some people who believe they have few risk factors may
calculate that they get at least one free bite at the apple and commit crime as
a result. In these situations, some prison time might be necessary even
in the absence of significant risk. The combination of these concerns
might result in a sentencing system similar to the original Model Penal
Code’s scheme, which established wide sentencing ranges for felonies
that all began at one year and increased in breadth according to crime
severity, with the caveat that even one-year sentences could be reduced
in light of the crime and the history and character of the defendant.137
This type of system would differ from limiting retributivism because no
particular minimum sentence would be required, the sentence range
would be broader, and most importantly, risk would be determined at the
back end by an expert panel rather than at the front end by a judge.
E. Objections 7, 8, and 9: Indeterminate Sentencing and Treatment,
Cost, and Offender Morale
Indeterminate sentencing would be focused on reducing risk through
rehabilitative efforts. Two traditional objections to this approach are
that rehabilitation seldom works and that, in any event, it is extremely
costly. A related objection is that when release decisions depend on
back-end calculations by correctional officials—as is the case with
indeterminate sentencing—rather than front-end evaluations by judges—
as occurs under either determinate sentencing or limiting retributivism—
unequal treatment, demoralized offenders, and cynicism about the
system are more likely.138
137. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.06 (1962) (setting sentence ranges from one to twenty
years or life imprisonment for first-degree felonies, one to ten years for second-degree
felonies, and one to five years for third-degree felonies); id. § 6.12 (allowing “reduction
of conviction” if the sentence is “unduly harsh” in light of “the nature and circumstances
of the crime and . . . the history and character of the defendant”).
138. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 49, 52, 57, 72–73 (1981).
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Rehabilitation is not a panacea. But even the criminal behavior of sex
offenders, who are a particularly difficult group to treat, can be reduced
through modern treatment programs. For instance, a review of sex
offender treatment programs around the world found that, on average,
treatment cut sexual recidivism almost by half, from 17% to 10%, and
general recidivism by more than a third, from 51% to 32%.139 Metareviews
of other offender treatment programs, especially those using cognitivebehavioral therapy, show similar reductions in recidivism.140 These
figures represent a major public health improvement in all senses of the
term.
Comprehensive correctional programs obviously cost more than a
prison system that merely aims at exacting punishment. Indeterminate
sentencing, correctly implemented, requires periodic evaluations and
hearings, treatment teams, and rehabilitation resources in the community
as well as in places of confinement. Once established, however, community
programs are less expensive on a per capita basis than institutions141 and
are much better at reducing recidivism than institutions, which tend to
exacerbate it.142 Overarching societal costs must also be taken into
account. The cost of a typical life of crime is estimated to be at least
$1.3 million.143 Rehabilitation shortens that type of life. It also shortens
time spent incarcerated and under state supervision, resulting in further
savings.
Of course, all of these programs can take place in a determinate
sentencing regime as well. But the legal basis for treatment in a
determinate regime is much weaker. A constitutional right to treatment,
designed to reduce risk, does not exist in a system in which desert is the
goal because treatment is not relevant to that goal; offenders do not
“deserve” treatment. In any event, a treatment orientation does not sit

139. R. Karl Hanson et al., First Report of the Collaborative Outcome Data Project
on the Effectiveness of Psychological Treatment for Sex Offenders, 14 SEXUAL ABUSE
169, 183, 185 (2002).
140. See Francis T. Cullen & Cheryl Lero Jonson, Rehabilitation and Treatment
Programs, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 130, at 293, 302–03 (reporting that
most “mean . . . effect sizes represent recidivism reductions in the 20 percent range,
varying upward to nearly 40 percent”).
141. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE: A REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL 105–14, 119 (2001) (concluding after a review of the relevant
research through 2000 that preventive juvenile justice programs “cost less over the long
run than mandatory sentences and other get-tough approaches”).
142. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More than It Hurts You: Social and
Legal Consequences of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 28 (2002) (“There is a consistent pattern of higher rates of criminal offending
among adolescents punished as adults compared to adolescents punished as juveniles.”).
143. Mark A. Cohen, The Monetary Value of Saving a High-Risk Youth, 14
J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 5, 7 & tbl.IV (1998).
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well in a retributive framework. Treatment in the community, which
should be a dispositional staple of indeterminate sentencing, does not
translate easily into retributive punishment,144 which is usually associated
with some type of institutionalization. Furthermore, because sentences
are set at the front end in both a determinate sentencing regime and a
regime based on limiting retributivism, success at treatment has no effect
on release, a feature that presumably diminishes the incentive to participate
in rehabilitative programs in the first instance.145
The front-end nature of determinate systems is seen by some as a major
benefit, however, because it eliminates the potential for discriminatory
or arbitrary decisions about release. Undoubtedly, such a potential exists,
especially if correctional personnel are ill-trained, risk-averse, or
lethargic.146 Furthermore, even a well-run program may strike some
offenders as unfair when they see another offender convicted of the same
offense released before they are, or when they are not released despite
what they perceive to be good faith efforts to reform.147 The latter
phenomenon can be exacerbated by risk assessment techniques that rely
primarily or wholly on static factors such as age at time of offense,
gender, and prior criminal history, about which the offender can do
nothing.
These concerns can be addressed in part by ensuring that trained
professionals conduct periodic reviews based on structured professional
judgments that take into account clinical and management risk factors as
well as historical ones.148 An additional advantage of these structured

144. Some might argue otherwise. See DUFF, supra note 122, at 100–02; see also
supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of punishment and how
some offenders may prefer prison sentences to longer periods of probation).
145. Petersilia, supra note 12, at 255 (“The elimination of discretionary parole
release undercut incentives for inmates to rehabilitate themselves while incarcerated.”).
146. For instance, experience with the United Kingdom’s Imprisonment for Public
Protection statute indicates that five years after its implementation only 4% of those
detained under that statute have been released after their two-year presumptive term
expired. JESSICA JACOBSON & MIKE HOUGH, UNJUST DESERTS: IMPRISONMENT FOR
PUBLIC PROTECTION 35 (2010).
147. Marc F. Plattner, The Rehabilitation of Punishment, 44 PUB. INT. 104, 107–08,
110 (1976).
148. This is a common practice in modern risk assessment and risk management.
See, e.g., Heilbrun, Yasuhara & Shah, supra note 114, at 7–10. As it turns out, many of
the most useful risk factors—substance abuse, prior supervision failure, negative attitudes,
impulsivity, exposure to destablilisers, and noncompliance with remediation attempts—
are dynamic. Jeremy W. Coid et al., Most Items in Structured Risk Assessment Instruments
Do Not Predict Violence, 22 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 3, 10–13 (2011).
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assessments is that they ensure transparency about the decisionmaking
process. Together with the periodic review requirement, they are arguably
much less subject to abuse than the everyday charging and bargaining
decisions made by prosecutors, which are notoriously difficult to monitor
and result in extremely disparate verdicts, yet form the sole bases for
sentences in determinate sentencing regimes.149 Unfortunately, abuses of
discretion occur in any system. It is not clear that indeterminate sentencing
is worse than any other system in that regard.
F. Objection 10: Indeterminate Sentencing and the Constitution
One might try to combine some or all of the foregoing objections into
an omnibus claim that indeterminate sentencing violates one or more
provisions of the Constitution. Purely as a doctrinal matter, however,
this sort of claim is unlikely to prevail. As already noted, reliance on
race in making a risk assessment is or should be a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause,150 but otherwise actuarial and clinical risk assessment
is probably immune from constitutional challenge.151 The Supreme
Court has made clear that sentencing decisions that do not exceed the
maximum established by the legislature, which would either not exist or
be set at high levels in an indeterminate sentencing regime, can be made
by judges or by parole boards without violating the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial.152 And with respect to the fundamental issue of whether
sentences may be based on risk, as far back as 1937 the Supreme Court
opined that the government

149. It is widely acknowledged that enormous disparity existed even under the old
mandatory federal guidelines. Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges,
Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1451–52 (2008); see
also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 130, at 467,
489 (concluding, based on a survey of research trying to assess disparity in determinate
sentencing systems, that “the goal of uniformity is so plastic that it is not worth very
much”); Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 20–21 (1998) (noting, after alleging significant discrimination
in prosecutorial charging practices, that “[s]elf-regulation by prosecution offices is largely
nonexistent or ineffective, and Supreme Court jurisprudence has protected prosecutors
from both public and judicial scrutiny” (footnote omitted)).
150. See, e.g., United States v. Taveras, 585 F. Supp. 2d 327, 336, 338 (E.D.N.Y.
2008).
151. See Monahan, supra note 78, at 430–32; see also Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S.
880, 896–903 (1983) (upholding admissibility of expert psychiatric testimony about
future dangerousness).
152. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309 (2004) (noting that although
indeterminate sentencing “increases judicial discretion,” it does not do so “at the expense
of the jury’s traditional function of finding the facts essential to lawful imposition of the
penalty” and thus does not violate the Sixth Amendment).
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may inflict a deserved penalty merely to vindicate the law or to deter or to
reform the offender or for all of these purposes. . . . [The offender’s] past may
be taken to indicate his present purposes and tendencies and significantly to
suggest the period of restraint and the kind of discipline that ought to be
imposed upon him.153

If there were any doubt about the issue, it was removed forty years later
in Jurek v. Texas,154 in which the Supreme Court held that even a death
sentence can be based solely on a determination of dangerousness.155
Post-sentence commitment—the fourth type of dispositional regime
described at the beginning of this Article—does not get off so easily
under the Constitution, however. It has already been noted that when the
Supreme Court upheld SVP laws in Kansas v. Hendricks, it also firmly
stated that once an offender has served his or her sentence, commitment
based on risk is permissible only if the offender is “dangerous beyond [his
or her] control.”156 As summarized in principle four, in the sex offender
post-sentence commitment context this language requires proof of serious
mental illness or serious impulsivity—amounting to obliviousness to the
prospect of criminal punishment—before an individual who has
completed a sentence may be committed.157 Unless this type of proof is
forthcoming, post-sentence commitment visits a true injustice on offenders
because it treats an autonomous individual as a nonautonomous
“predator” or as an autonomous actor willing only to choose antisocial
behavior. Unfortunately, courts have routinely permitted post-sentence
commitment in the absence of this undeterrability predicate.158 In
such cases, a constitutional claim should have merit.
The reason a similar predicate is not required in order to impose an
indeterminate sentence is that this type of disposition immediately
follows upon conviction and is implemented as part of the criminal
process. Only when risk-based dispositions take place outside the criminal
context must there be, as Hendricks held, an additional predisposition
showing, to the effect that the individual is characteristically unaffected

153. Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937).
154. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275–76 (1976).
155. Id. at 274–75; see also Ted Sampsell-Jones, Preventive Detention, Character
Evidence, and the New Criminal Law, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 723, 752–56 (2010) (noting
that incapacitation, not retribution, was the primary motivation for punishment in colonial
times).
156. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 358 (1997).
157. SLOBOGIN, supra note 1, at 133–40.
158. Id. at 254.
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by the dictates of the criminal law.159 When offenders are capable of being
deterred—even if they are not in fact deterred in a given instance—they
should be handled through the criminal justice system or left alone.
IV. A KEY CAVEAT: HOW BEST TO PREVENT RECIDIVISM?
Even if the foregoing analysis is correct, indeterminate sentencing
loses its allure if it is not appreciably better than other sentencing regimes at
reducing crime. The evidence on this point is admittedly mixed.
A recent theoretical treatment of this issue concluded that “[t]he more
mandatory are the guidelines, the larger is the increase in crime.”160 But
the most sophisticated study on the topic, relying on 1990s pre/post data,
found that although mandatory parole release—in essence, determinate
sentencing—turned out to be worse than discretionary parole release
at reducing recidivism in New York and North Carolina, it was better
than discretionary release at reducing reoffending in Maryland and Virginia;
the study also found that in Texas and Oregon the releasing mechanism
had no significant effect on recidivism.161 The authors concluded that
“[t]he effects on recidivism may depend more on the workings of postrelease supervision policies and rehabilitation programs in specific states
than from sentencing models themselves.”162 They also noted that the
observed differences could result from “various supervision approaches
within the states, differing expertise of state parole boards, or differing
crime categories that are legislatively mandated” and called for further
research to disentangle these effects.163 Research comparing determinate
and indeterminate sentencing in terms of other outcome variables, such
as the percentage of prisoners who have committed violent offenses and

159. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
160. Joanna Shepherd, Blakely’s Silver Lining: Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial
Discretion, and Crime, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 574 (2007).
161. Yan Zhang, Lening Zhang & Michael S. Vaughn, Indeterminate and Determinate
Sentencing Models: A State-Specific Analysis of Their Effects on Recidivism, CRIME &
DELINQUENCY 1 (Dec. 8, 2009), http://cad.sagepub.com/content/early/2009/12/08/001112
8709354047.full.pdf+html.
162. Id. at 18.
163. Id. at 19. For other studies that arrived at opposing results about the
recidivism-reducing effects of discretionary and determinate sentences, see Richard
Rosenfeld, Joel Wallman & Robert Fornango, The Contribution of Ex-Prisoners to
Crime Rates, in PRISONER REENTRY AND CRIME IN AMERICA 80, 102–03 (Jeremy Travis
& Christy Visher eds., 2005), which concludes that “expanded use of discretionary
parole supervision” is the best method of protecting the public, and William D. Bales et
al., An Assessment of the Development and Outcomes of Determinate Sentencing in
Florida, 12 JUST. RES. & POL’Y, Spring 2010, at 41, 47, 64–66, which found that the
“primary” reason for Florida’s increase in prison population has been an increase in
felony convictions rather than its conversion to determinate sentencing, and that truth-insentencing has contributed to recidivism reduction.
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the effect on the size of incarcerated populations, has also returned mixed
results.164
The import of these findings is that the efficacy of indeterminate
sentencing conducted consistently with the principles set out in this
Article is unknown. More localized study is essential. In the meantime,
we should not abandon indeterminate sentencing but continue to
experiment with it.
V. CONCLUSION
All of the articles in this Symposium accept the premise that, under
some circumstances, the state may deprive people of liberty based solely
on the risk they pose to others. But all of them either limit preventive
power so significantly that public safety concerns are largely ignored or
devote insufficient attention to limitations that should be imposed on any
preventive detention that takes place. The first part of this Article
assumes that preventive intervention by government is both inevitable
and desirable and lays out principles that should govern that exercise of
power.
The second part of this Article focused on sentencing and argued that
indeterminate sentencing is superior to both desert-based sentencing and
post-sentence commitment as a prevention mechanism. It also defended
indeterminate sentencing against charges that the risk assessment and
risk management model on which it rests is not viable, too costly,
inadequate as a general deterrent, and unjust to the offender, the victim,
or society as a whole. Although relevant empirical work to date is
inconclusive, if implemented in a manner consistent with fundamental
constitutional and evidentiary principles, indeterminate sentencing is
likely to be not only the optimal method of preventing recidivism but
also the most jurisprudentially sound method of doing so.

164. See Don Stemen & Andres F. Rengifo, Policies and Imprisonment: The Impact
of Structured Sentencing and Determinate Sentencing on State Incarceration Rates,
1978–2004, 28 JUST. Q. 174, 174–77 (2011); Kevin R. Reitz, Don’t Blame Determinacy:
U.S. Incarceration Growth Has Been Driven by Other Factors, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1787,
1787 (2006).
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